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Helicopter pilots face unique challenges with regard to adverse weather when compared
to fixed-wing pilots. Rotorcraft typically operate at lower altitudes in off-field areas that
are not always well covered by weather reporting stations. Although recent technological
advances have increased the amount of weather data that pilots can access in the cockpit,
weather remains a factor in 28% of fatal helicopter accidents. In this work, commercial
helicopter pilots were surveyed and interviewed to better understand how they gather and
process weather information, what the perceived limitations of current weather tools are,
and how their decision-making process is affected by the information they gather and/or
receive. Pilots were found to use a wide variety of weather sources for their initial go or
no-go decision during the preflight phase, but use fewer weather sources in the cockpit while
in-flight. Pilots highlighted the sparsity and sometimes inaccuracy of the weather information
available to them in their prototypical operational domain. To compensate, they are forced
to rely on local and experiential weather knowledge to supplement weather reports while
still working to mitigate other external pressures. Based on the literature and on results
from this work, recommendations are made to address the weather-related gaps faced by the
rotorcraft community. This includes the installation of additional weather reporting stations
outside of airports and densely populated areas, the further promotion of the HEMS tool to
helicopter pilots in all industries, the development of weather tools capable of visualizing light
precipitation such as fog, and the development of in-flight graphical displays that can help
reduce the cognitive workload of interpreting weather information.
Nomenclature
𝐴𝐶𝑇𝐴 = Applied Cognitive Task Analysis
𝐴𝐷𝑆 − 𝐵 = Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
𝐴𝐺𝐿 = Above Ground Level
𝐴𝑀𝑂𝐴 = Air Medical Operators Association
𝐴𝑃𝑆𝐴 = Airborne Public Safety Association
𝐴𝑇 = Air Tour / Air Taxi
𝐴𝑇𝐶 = Air Traffic Control
𝐴𝑇𝑃 = Airline Transport Pilot
𝐴𝑆𝑂𝑆 = Automated Surface Observing System
𝐴𝑊𝑂𝑆 = Automated Weather Observing System
𝐸𝐹𝐵 = Electronic Fight Bag
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𝐹𝐴𝐴 = Federal Aviation Administration
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇 = Flight Risk Analysis Tool
𝐹𝑆𝑆 = Flight Service Stations
𝐻𝐴𝐴 = Helicopter Air Ambulance
𝐻𝐴𝐼 = Helicopter Association International
𝐻𝐸𝑀𝑆 = Helicopter Emergency Medical Services
𝐻𝑂𝑊𝐼 = Helicopter Operations Weather Information
𝐻𝑆𝐴 = Helicopter Safety Alliance
𝐼𝐹𝑅 = Instrument Flight Rules
𝐼𝐻𝑆𝐹 = International Helicopter Safety Foundation
𝐼𝑀𝐶 = Instrument Meteorological Conditions
𝐼 𝐼𝑀𝐶 = Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions
𝐿𝐸 = Law Enforcement
𝑁𝑇𝑆𝐵 = National Transportation Safety Board
𝑃𝐸𝐺𝐴𝑆𝐴𝑆 = Partnership to Enhance General Aviation Safety, Accessibility, and Sustainability
𝑆𝑂𝑃 = Standard Operating Procedures
𝑇𝐴𝐹 = Terminal Aerodrome Forecast
𝑇𝐴𝑊𝑆 = Terrain Awareness and Warning System
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑆 = Tour Operators Program of Safety
𝑈𝑆𝐻𝑆𝑇 = United States Helicopter Safety Team
𝑉𝐹𝑅 = Visual Flight Rules
𝑉𝑀𝐶 = Visual Meteorological Conditions
𝑊𝑇𝐼𝐶 = Weather Technology In the Cockpit
I. Introduction
The safety records of commercial aircraft operating under different Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Parts in the
United States are inconsistent at best. While commercial air carriers flying under Part 121 have had a fatal accident
rate of 0.006 per 100,000 flight hours over the last two decades [1], General Aviation (GA) operators flying under
Part 91 and Part 135 have had a fatal accident rate closer to 0.80 per 100,000 flight hours [2]. This discrepancy
has led the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to identify safety improvements to Part 135 operations on
their 2019-2020 most wanted list [3]. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) created the Partnership to Enhance
General Aviation Safety, Accessibility, and Sustainability (PEGASAS), an FAA Center of Excellence, to address GA
safety concerns [4]. This work is performed as part of PEGASAS Project 34, which investigates the effects of adverse
weather and weather information on helicopter pilots’ decision-making.
Many studies on GA safety focus on fixed-wing aircraft rather than rotorcraft, and are scoped such that a particular
industry or geographical area is the primary focus, as outlined in Churchwell et al. [5]. Unfortunately, because of the
significant differences in the types of operations performed by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, the applicability
of these studies to rotorcraft is low. By design, rotorcraft typically operate at altitudes at or below 2,000 ft above
ground level (AGL) and often have off-field landing sites, starkly in contrast to prototypical fixed-wing operations. In
this context, aviation-specific weather sources often have the highest fidelity near airports and at high altitudes where
fixed-wing aircraft operate, contrary to rotorcraft operations, and thus are less helpful to helicopter pilots. Additionally,
while many fixed-wing aircraft are equipped to fly in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), a large portion of
the U.S. fleet of helicopters is not certified for instrument flight rules (IFR) operations. This lack of available weather
information can put helicopter pilots at risk of encountering inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions (IIMC),
which is a highly dangerous situation. This clearly motivates an investigation into the impact of adverse weather
on commercial helicopter safety and how weather affects pilots’ decision-making and standard operating procedures
(SOPs) using an interactive, interview-based approach.
In this study, we focus on three types of helicopter operations, namely Helicopter Air Ambulance (HAA), Law
Enforcement (LE), and Air Tour/Air Taxi (AT). We utilized a survey- and interview-based approach to gather information
on how pilots operating in these mission areas retrieve and process weather information, what their perceived limitations
of current weather sources and technologies are with regard to relevance, accuracy, latency, and other relevant metrics,
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and how their decision-making process is affected by the information they gather and/or receive. The paper is divided
in to seven sections. In section II, we review the relevant literature for this study. In section III, we describe our
survey- and interview-based approach and introduce the data and methods used for the survey and pilot interviews. In
section IV, we analyze and discuss the results and themes obtained from the survey. In section V, we analyze and
discuss the interviews realized on a sample of pilots from the three main mission areas of interest. In section VI, we
summarize the main takeaways from both the survey and the interviews. Finally, in section VII, we conclude with
the main contributions of this study and provide recommendations to decrease the occurrence of weather encounters
during helicopter operations.
II. Literature Review
The vast majority of work done to understand the role that weather plays in aviation accidents has focused on fixed-
wing operations. Included in this literature is a recent study completed in 2018. This work, identified several gaps in
pilot decision-making with respect to weather information [6]. The primary gap that was identified by Caldwell et al. is
that "There is a limited understanding of how FAA - authorized weather information sources, as presented/displayed in
the range of available tools (including mobile devices and software applications), influences pilot interaction with and
use of weather information in degrading conditions." However, this study focused primarily emphasized fixed-wing
GA aircraft, largely leaving rotorcraft operations unaddressed. Consequently the findings do not directly carry over as
fixed-wing and rotorcraft operations are distinct along a number of dimensions.
Of studies that have focused on rotorcraft safety, much interest has been placed on specific industries or areas, as
explained in [5]. A number of studies have looked specifically at Helicopter Air Ambulance (HAA) operations due
to their high risk, high visibility missions 1. In 2006, the NTSB published its second special investigation report on
HAA operations and identified four primary themes: inconsistent risk evaluation with versus without patients onboard,
lack of flight risk evaluation programs for HAA-specific operations, lack of consistent flight dispatch services, and
no requirements regarding the use of advanced technologies in the cockpit, such as Terrain Awareness and Warning
System (TAWS) or weather radar [8]. These recommendations were made based on a case series of seven HAA
accidents between 2002 and 2005. It was also noted that while only 38% of HAA flights occurred at night, nearly 50%
of accidents occurred at night. This indicated a correlation between flight environmental conditions and the likelihood
of an accident occurring.
Another short investigation of HAA accidents by Butler from 2000 to 2014 revealed that, of the 157 accidents
analyzed, 30%, or 47 total accidents, were fatal [9]. Of the 47 fatal accidents, weather was a contributing factor in
47%, or 22 of them. The author recommended that the FAA raise the enroute weather minimums for FAR Part 135
operations, which HAA falls under, as a solution to this finding.
Widening the scope to all helicopter operations, weather was involved in 17% of all helicopter events (accidents
and incidents) and 28% of fatal helicopter accidents between 2008 and 2018 [10]. This observation motivated a study
on the existence of technological, training, skill or ability gaps related to weather for helicopter operations. Although
a statistical analysis based on safety investigations similar to the one presented in [10] is useful to understand causal
factors and accident types linked to weather, it is more difficult to identify human factors issues and decision-making
chains that might have led to the accident. It also fails to capture strategies developed by pilots to avoid getting into a
weather incident and the associated workload and cognitive demand. For this reason, we believe that a more personal
approach based on surveys and interviews can complement a data analytic approach. Due to the intricacies of the
situations faced by pilots and their risk mitigation strategies, in addition to the lack of literature utilizing helicopter
operator interviews as safety-related evidence sources, we believe that an interview-based approach providing pilot
feedback on operation-specific safety with respect to weather will produce novel conclusions.
III. Approach
This work consisted of two separate, but complementary, studies. The first is a survey to better understand
pilots’ flight operations, equipment and weather sources. The second is a semi-structured interview using the Applied
1HAA was previously referred to as Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS), but this terminology was officially phased out by the
FAA in a 2015 Advisory Circular [7].
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Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA) method [11]. Both were designed to better understand pilot use of weather information
both prior to flight and during flight. Details of each will be discussed in turn.
A. Survey
1. Survey Design
As part of the PEGASAS Project 34 data collection process, a survey was devised to supplement the NTSB statistics,
understand the kind of weather information used by rotorcraft operators and get their opinion on the weather products
that are available to them. The survey consisted of three main sections: 1) Demographics, 2) Flight environment, and
3) Safety Operations. The demographics section established the respondent’s background (the respondent may be a
pilot, a crew member, a dispatcher, a safety professional, etc.), including information about the piloting and/or flight
crew experience if applicable (years of experience and the industry in which they accrued that experience). The second
section collected information pertaining to the flight environments typical for the operations considered. This included
geographical terrain, weather conditions, and weather-related information sources and/or instrumentation used by the
operation. The third section pertained to the safety of the operations for each respondent. If the respondent had ever
experienced a weather-related incident or accident, he/she was asked to describe the event along with the level of
preparedness to handle the event. This was extended to also investigate the strengths or deficiencies of technologies
used to prepare for and react to the event. The survey is available in Appendix I.
2. Survey Distribution
The survey targeted helicopter professionals whether they were helicopter pilots, crew, dispatch, or safety personnel.
It was first published and distributed in January 2020 at HAI HeliExpo, and then was publicized in newsletters and
websites in the helicopter community: newsletters (HAI Rotor Daily Newsletter, HSA Newsletter), websites (IHSF,
USHST), and mailing lists (AMOA, Coast Guard, APSA, TOPS). The survey was closed in August 2020.
3. Survey Responses
The results of the survey were first filtered to only keep answers from respondents located in the United States who
had completed the entire survey, yielding a total of 216 complete set of responses. Moreover, although the survey was
also aimed at helicopter crew and dispatch personnel, 90% of the respondents were rotorcraft pilots. The results were
filtered to only keep answers from helicopter pilots, and the analysis presented in the next section is performed on the
resulting 194 U.S. rotorcraft pilots’ answers to the survey. The anonymized survey dataset and its documentation are
available at [12].
4. Survey Limitations
Although the survey was aimed at all professional helicopter pilots, it was answered largely by pilots with helicopter
air ambulance (HAA) experience (70%). According to the FAA GA and Part 135 survey, HAA operations only
accounted for 16% of all helicopter flight hours between 2008 and 2018. As such, it can be expected that HAA pilots
similarly account for a smaller share of the American helicopter pilot population than 70%, and the survey answers
cannot be considered fully representative of the entire rotorcraft pilot population. Nonetheless, it does provide useful
insights into the weather experience of HAA and other helicopter pilots.
B. Interviews
1. Interview Design
The focus of the interviews was to gather more specific and descriptive information from pilots about their use
of weather data, how weather impacts their regular operations, and specific examples of flights or situations in which
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weather had potential detrimental impacts on their operations. The goal was to substantiate our understanding of
the cognitive challenges involved during adverse weather encounters and the cognitive processes that allow pilots to
maintain situational awareness in the presence of adverse weather. Three pilots from each of the following industries
were interviewed: HAA, Air Tour / Air Taxi (AT), and law enforcement (LE). The questions set developed by the
authors was the same for all participants and available in Appendix II.
Specifically, the interviews followed the ACTA method developed by Militello and Hutton [11]. ACTA is designed
to be a simple, broadly useful framework for an interviewer to extract information pertaining to the skills used by the
interviewee to complete a task [11]. The purpose of using the ACTA framework in this analysis is that the methods are
typically simple to implement, the questions guide both the interviewer and participant toward the research questions,
and the outputted evidence of the interviews is typically clear and concise. Therefore, the participant is able to recall
the relevant information and produce it in a coordinated and consistent manner for transcription.
The semi-structured interviews performed in this analysis were comprised of three unique stages: 1) Surface-
level interview and task diagram, 2) Weather incident overview, and 3) Knowledge audit [13, 14]. Accordingly, the
interviews were separated into distinct sessions by stage to prevent mental fatigue for both the interviewer and the
interviewee. The full list of questions used to extract information from the transcripts can be found in Appendix III.
Stage 1 of the interview process is a surface-level interview to depict the operation’s standard operating procedures
(SOP). The pilots were asked to describe their typical mission profile, identify any cognitively challenging aspects of
their missions with regard to weather, and explain how they deal with degraded weather conditions. Stage 2 dives
deeper into weather-related events that the pilot has encountered. This can include events such as flying into IIMC,
dealing with conflicting weather information from various sources, flying IFR with significant external pressures, and
more. For each event, the pilot is asked to describe a timeline of the event, along with a discussion of the weather
information that they attended to and used for the corresponding flight. The final interview, Stage 3, is what is called a
"knowledge audit". It steps back to a higher level of thinking once again, and facilitates a discussion of what the pilots
pay attention to in-flight, how they stay focused and work efficiently in-flight, and what weather-related technologies
help and/or hinder their operations and why. It also covers the pilot’s opinions on their SOP, how the SOP could
potentially be improved with regard to weather to enhance safety, and how they recognize when their missions will
deviate from their SOP.
2. Interview Participation
A total of nine pilots representing HAA, Air Tour / Air Taxi (AT), and law enforcement (LE) were interviewed. The
participants were recruited from the survey. The survey demographics allowed us to select a set of highly experienced,
high hour pilots.
3. Interview & Analysis Protocol
Each interview was conducted using a video conferencing software with audio recordings saved for transcription
purposes. The audio recordings for each interview were transcribed using the Otter.ai software 2 and reviewed for
accuracy by the authors.
Following the transcription, a thematic content analysis was completed by two independent researchers. They
sought to find common themes across four major research questions:
1) How are pilots using weather information?
2) What is cognitively difficult about their use of weather information?
3) What are the cultural elements that influence their seeking and use of weather information?
4) Were there any common themes among weather incidents?
Upon identifying the themes of interest, the transcripts were re-reviewed by both researchers independently to
identify additional evidence for or against each theme. Quality control was achieved by calculating an inter-rater
reliability metric, namely the Cohen Kappa Statistic 𝜅 [15] as shown in Equation 1. For this statistic, 𝑝0 is the relative
observed agreement among raters, and 𝑝𝑒 is the probability of a chance agreement. In this case, 𝑝𝑒 is assumed to
be zero due to the negligibly small probability that the two raters randomly choose the same lines of text from the
2https://otter.ai
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transcripts. Results with a Kappa statistic that falls within the range of 0.7 ≤ 𝜅 ≤ 1 is considered to be acceptable for






Inter-rater reliability scores of above 70% were achieved for all three industries analyzed, as shown in Table 1. As
previously stated, an inter-rater reliability score of 0.7 or greater is acceptable.
Table 1 Kappa values for the three industries of interest
Helicopter Air Ambulance Air Taxi Law Enforcement
𝜅 0.7239 0.7045 0.8273
IV. Survey Results
Almost all pilots who answered the survey reported using digital tools and graphical displays both during the
preflight and enroute phases of flight. HAA pilots reported having access to panel-mounted displays more than other
commercial helicopter pilots, who answered they rely predominantly on external devices and applications. The HEMS
tool was found not to be used often outside of the HAA industry. Most pilots are satisfied with the weather information
available to them, and almost all pilots reported having received recent IIMC training. HAA pilots had a higher
reported rate of helicopter IFR currency than all others.
A. Weather Tools and Sources
Weather technology has changed appreciably in the last decade. In the 2012 study presented in Casner et al. [16],
only 25% of pilots made regular use of direct weather products and rarely called briefers, whereas according to the FAA,
[17] in 2017 about 96% of briefings were provided online. Following this trend, pilots responding to our survey largely
reported using digital weather products. For the preflight phase, 92% of pilots reported using an online tool such as the
aviation weather center website 3 or the HEMS weather tool 4, and 77% reported using mobile or tablet applications
such as Foreflight 5. Enroute, 91% of pilots reported using their radio to listen to automated weather reports such as
AWOS and ASOS, while 92% of pilots also have access to a graphical weather display, either through a panel-mounted
display or a mobile phone or tablet application. Radar data in the cockpit can be accessed through ADS-B IN, through
satellite weather, or directly with an onboard weather radar. The survey results indicate that all pilots rely heavily on
online tools. In Figures 1 and 2, respondents were categorized based on whether they reported having HAA experience
or not. Both figures show some differences in tool usages. Performing a preflight risk assessment is mandatory for
HAA pilots. It can be done through a dedicated Flight Risk Assessment Tool (FRAT), but is sometimes integrated in
an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). This explains why these two categories of tools are used at higher rates by HAA pilots.
HAA pilots were more likely to report using a cockpit display for weather and less likely to use an additional device
such as a phone or a tablet than non-HAA pilots. This points to a difference of in-flight weather equipment between
industries.
When asked about the weather information sources they used for preflight or in-flight, pilots generally selected
multiple sources: 81% of pilots selected 3 or more types of weather information sources for preflight. On average
pilots selected 2.8 weather information sources when asked about their in-flight weather sources, while, on average,
they selected 3.6 weather sources when asked the same question about preflight. Pilots have access to fewer weather






Fig. 1 Number of respondents by HAA experience who reported using each category of preflight weather
information source (the percentages are by category of HAA experience)
Fig. 2 Number of respondents by HAA experience who reported using each category of inflight weather
information source (the percentages are by category of HAA experience)
Analyzing the answers of pilots who reported using online tools showed that 32% of all pilots explicitly mention the
HEMS weather tool. However, of those 62 pilots, only 4 (6.5%) did not have HAA experience. It would therefore appear
that the HEMS tool is underused outside of the HAA industry. Although the HEMS tool was originally developed for
Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, its use is now encouraged for all types of low altitude helicopter operations.
It provides a graphical display on which the user can overlay different weather information, including low altitude
visibility data, which is especially relevant to helicopters who routinely fly between 800 and 2,000 ft AGL.
B. Opinion on Weather Products
When asked if the weather tools at their disposal were sufficient for safe operations, 71% of pilots answered
positively. Among pilots who answered negatively, the most common complaint was the sparseness of weather stations.
This complaint was also commonly recorded during pilots’ interviews, as will be described in the subsequent section.
Pilots who did not report HAA experience were less likely to report being dissatisfied with the weather tools at their
disposal. This could be due to HAA pilots operating in more remote areas where they are more likely to find sparse
weather stations or being asked to fly with less notice than pilots in other industries. However, no significant differences
were found in terms of terrain of operations with respect to HAA experience. HAA pilots were slightly more likely to
select city, flatland, and forests compared to non-HAA experienced pilots. Mountainous, suburban, and coastal terrain
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types were selected at the same rate between the two groups. It is worth noting than non-HAA pilot selected fewer
terrain types than HAA pilots (an average of 2.6 against 2.9), which might indicate that they operate in a more restricted
area. When asked specifically about weather tools latencies, 38% of pilots answered that latency could be a hindrance
to safe operations.
C. Training for Weather-Related Emergency
Although almost all respondents (97%) had encountered or knew someone who had encountered adverse weather
in-flight, these adverse weather events had not led to an incident or an accident in most cases (81%).
An analysis of the NTSB accident database showed that the most common type of fatal accidents caused by weather
is Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IIMC) [10]. In the survey, 97% of pilots reported that they
had received IIMC training: 90% of them received training within the past year and 69% of them received training
within the last 6 months. This shows that a large majority of professional pilots are educated and trained for those
conditions regularly, yet IIMC still remains the most common type of fatal accidents caused by weather [10]. An
analysis of NTSB accident reports showed that fatal IIMC accidents often involved trained pilots. This could indicate
that current training might not be sufficiently effective. However, being IIMC-trained should not be confused with
being IFR current. In fact, only 56% of pilots reported being IFR current for rotorcraft operations. However, there
are differences depending on the industry. Current regulations mandate that HAA pilots hold an helicopter IFR rating
(currency not required) or an ATP certificate not restricted to VFR. As could be expected, 97% of pilots who reported
having HAA experience were helicopter IFR rated, and only 60% were helicopter IFR current. Among pilots who did
not report HAA experience, only 62% were helicopter IFR rated, and only 44% were helicopter IFR current. HAA
pilots are more likely to be trained and current for helicopter IFR operations. This makes sense due to the nature of
their operations. HAA pilots are more likely to report commonly operating at night (80% versus 52%) or under IFR
(38% versus 13%) than other pilots. Finally, among pilots that reported having HAA experience, 58% also reported
having military experience.
V. Interview Results
Across the four primary research questions, five primary themes were identified in this study:
1) Sparsity of weather sensing/reporting or lack of weather information
2) Reliance on local or experiential weather knowledge
3) Impact of current technology on safety
4) External pressures on weather-related decision-making
5) Distrust of weather information
The five themes cut across multiple research questions, and as such we will present them here independent from the
research questions and then summarize their implications for the research questions in the Discussion section. These
themes were identified due to not only the high percentage of pilots that mentioned them, but also to the number of
times they were mentioned by each pilot. It should be noted that there are instances where pilots responded with
similar comments to particular themes, but the evidence was either repetitive or simply not chosen for quotation. To
better capture the scope of how many pilots truly spoke to a particular theme, a notation has been devised to identify
how many pilots from each industry made similar comments. Each theme will be prefaced with the following notation
( HAA | LE | AT ), where the acronym will be replaced with the number of pilots that made similar comments for
that respective industry. For example, since there were three interviewees per industry, if every single pilot spoke to a
particular theme, the notation would be (3|3|3). This should assist with highlighting the trends identified in this study.
A brief summary of the takeaways is described below and supporting evidence is presented in the subsequent sections.
For the first theme of weather sensing sparsity and lack of weather information (see §V.A), the interview responses
indicate that there is significant overlap amongst rotorcraft pilots with regard to how they use weather information,
despite the differences in their respective industries. All nine of the helicopter pilots across all three industries have
experienced, and still deal with, the challenges associated with using weather information designed for fixed-wing
aircraft operations rather than for rotorcraft operations. This presents itself largely in terms of sparse or unavailable
weather information at sites of interest for helicopter operators, mostly for those who operate in environments away
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from airports (off-field).
For the second theme of reliance on personal experience (see §V.B), the interview responses indicate that when
pilots reported a lack of sufficient weather information, they are often forced to rely on local or experiential knowledge
of their flight environment to project the current visual conditions into the future. While local knowledge is a very
valuable tool for pilots, it should be noted that it is not a viable substitute for a thorough check of all available weather
sources both during preflight and in-flight. Some pilots reported trusting the visuals and the historical knowledge of
their flight route so heavily that they would often disregard weather reports that presented information contrary to their
own experiential projections.
For the third theme of current technology safety impact (see §V.C), the interview responses indicate that technology
and the lack thereof play a significant role in what weather sources pilots use in-flight and also how they make weather-
related decisions. Pilots indicated that over the years, weather technology has improved significantly, especially with
the integration of graphical displays like NEXRAD 6, onboard radar, and even EFB-based tools like Foreflight. The
biggest downside seemed to be that new weather technologies still experience latency sometimes in excess of 15
minutes, leaving pilots with inaccurate information simply because it was out of date. Additionally, modern radar tools
still cannot detect and warn pilots of light precipitation conditions like fog, which can significantly reduce visibility
and even cause IIMC events.
For the fourth theme of external pressure (see §V.D), the interview responses indicate the presence of external
pressures on pilots is shown to be nearly universal. While the source of the pressures might have been different, the
effect on the pilots was seemingly identical. External pressures cause tunnel vision, which detract from the pilots
abilities to maintain situational awareness or focus on the big picture during flight. Mitigating external pressures can
be done at both the personal and the organizational levels, and it is important to do so while establishing a proper safety
culture.
For the final theme of weather information distrust (see §V.E), the interview responses indicate that pilots had
experiences in which they were misled by weather information presented to them. Whether it was a lack of awareness
of the inherent latency in the weather information received, or trusting a weather reporting source that was providing
inaccurate data, pilots found themselves in dangerous situations. This reinforces the importance of using a variety of
weather sources to validate incoming weather information and to allow for greater situational awareness, especially
while in-flight.
Each of the following sections provides detailed discussion and evidence for each theme. The evidence is cited
using the following notation: [Interviewee Code, Interview Stage, Transcript Line Number]. The interviewee code
was randomly assigned to each interview participant, and is always prefixed by their industry (HAA, LE, or AT). As
already discussed, there were three interview stages that evidence is drawn from.
A. Sparsity of Weather Sensing/Reporting or Lack of Weather Information
One of the most prevalent themes among all pilots was the sparsity of or complete lack of weather information
available. All nine of the interviewed pilots (3|3|3) indicated that this is presently a hindrance to their day-to-day
operations. They also noted that many of the aviation weather sources that are available to pilots are tailored to fixed-
wing operations, as exemplified in the following interview transcript excerpt. Fixed-wing aircraft typically operate at
higher altitudes and predominantly fly airport-to-airport missions. Conversely, rotorcraft fly slower, lower, and are
specifically utilized for their maneuverability in off-field operations.
“I’d like to add one thing... a lot of that information is designed for fixed wing. There’s very little
information designed for rotorcraft... So I think that is definitely a helicopter challenge.” [AT1, Stage 1,
568]
Due to the off-field nature of some rotorcraft operations, a theme from pilots (3|1|2) was that weather information
is sparse when flying to or from a location which is not near an airport/airfield. Most AWOS/ASOS stations are,
appropriately, co-located at airports, meaning that location-specific weather data is often unavailable for helicopter
pilots in their areas of interest. This means that they must rely on either a tool that interpolates weather data, such as the
6https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-access/radar-data/nexrad
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HEMS weather tool, or must do this themselves, often with no technological support. Additionally, the HEMS weather
tool was frequently mentioned as a preflight resource, but due to the lack of availability in-flight, pilots seemingly
lacked tools that could similarly display weather trends. This is noted by two pilots as follows:
“Most of the accurate weather is taken at airports, and the system is designed for airport to airport travel
and we don’t go there. We go everywhere but the airport, so you know we’re flying off site...” [LE2, Stage
1, 272]
“I have the weather here, my liftoff point, I have the weather at my destination. What’s the weather in
between? That was always the question mark.” [HAA2, Stage 1, 176]
Along these same lines, eight of the nine pilots (3|3|2) indicated that the lack of sufficiently detailed weather
information had required them to alter their missions . Most often, this mission alteration would be due to preflight
weather indications conducive to VFR followed by in-flight encounters with weather that either pushed or exceeded
their allowable minimums, as exemplified in the following interview transcript excerpts.
“We accepted the mission VFR and proceeded out. And probably about 15-20 minutes into the mission, we
started encountering some intermittent lower ceilings that were going to put us below our VFR minimums.”
[HAA3, Stage 2, 41]
“Florida, summer, you know, afternoon we see thunderstorms building around the area. And then at one
point we decided, hey, it’s time to head back to the airport. Because we had no onboard weather, we
had no iPad, no NEXRAD, nothing, just what was outside the window and reports from the tower.” [LE2,
Stage 2, 66]
Finally, some of the interviewed pilots (1|2|2) mentioned that the most common weather type associated with
mission interruption was fog. Fog is invisible on a radar, and therefore pilots indicated that they relied primarily on
weather reporting stations to identify visibility concerns due to fog. When weather reporting stations or various other
weather sources used by pilots fail to identify fog during a preflight check, it is often up to the pilots visual scanning and
overall situational awareness to mitigate risks due to fog, as exemplified in the following interview transcript excerpt.
“I encountered just like kind of a misty fog. And I couldn’t see it on radar...when I looked through
ADS-B it didn’t show anything, it looked like a clear flight. So, I was going along and visibility started to
reduce...and I had to drop down, drop down a little bit and then I decided you know, I’ll just quit.” [LE1,
Stage 2, 59-63]
B. Reliance on Local Weather Knowledge or Past Experience
The second major theme identified in the interview process was a heavy reliance of pilots (3|2|3) on experiential
knowledge of their respective operating environments. When weather sources or weather information are found to be
sparse, missing, or incorrect, pilots indicated that they would immediately fall back on visual scanning and knowledge
of the historical weather trends in their operational area. Decision-making, in that case, is mostly driven by pilots
projecting their past experiences related to their flight route into the future, as noted below.
“...we have to take into account what weather we’ve historically seen based on the environment, and really
that was a lot of our decision making, just kind of historical experience.” [AT2, Stage 1, 243]
It was also indicated that weather information for their local area can be “reliably inaccurate” to the point where one
pilot joked that he expects the weather to always just be the opposite of whatever their local weather stations predict.
This goes to show that the pilots tend to trust themselves and trust their own past experiences far more than they trust
the data being provided to them externally, including by FAA-approved sources. This is exemplified by the following
interview transcript excerpts.
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“More often than not, you’re just as good at forecasting the weather as the guys at the National Weather
Service are because you estimate those patterns coming through this region.” [HAA3, Stage 1, 262]
“The local area experience is worth its weight in gold. Absolutely, it really pays dividends when you know
the trends in your area, how inaccurate the forecasts are...how things are going to play out.” [LE3, Stage
2, 185-187]
There are negative implications of pilots discounting certain sources of weather information. Some pilots indicated
that they stopped checking notoriously inaccurate sources altogether, which implies that one less source of weather
information is being used for each flight. According to the pilots, the best way to mitigate this is to posses and use a
diverse set of weather sources and weather information to maintain a big picture view of the mission and catch any
information outliers. However, the need to aggregate data from multiple sources puts a substantial strain on memory
and cognitive resources.
It is also relevant to note that flights in marginal weather with ceilings of 1000 feet or less are a common
practice among pilots interviewed (2|2|3). These low-ceiling flights indicate that pilots’ personal and company weather
minimums are fairly aggressive, especially if this type of operation is frequent.
"So again, the whole time it was forecast for 600-800 foot ceilings, but it went down to I broke at bare
minimums on that ILS at 200 feet. And when I actually came into land it was it was right on the edge of
No, we’re going to make the go around." [HEMS1, Stage 2, 87]
"We knew we had marginal VFR weather, you know, close to 1000ft and 3 mi, but helicopter pilots operate
in that kind of weather all the time." [LE3, Stage 2, 66-69]
When operating in poor visibility and/or low ceiling conditions, pilots are left to rely on their knowledge of the
local area to complete their missions. While operating in marginal weather, pilots inherently have less margin for error,
so it’s even more important that the weather information is accurate. Personal or organizational weather policies that
allow for flight in degraded weather can significantly deter pilots’ abilities to make sound and efficient decisions while
in-flight.
C. Impact of Current Technology on Safety
During the interviews, pilots were asked to provide examples when weather had significantly altered their plans. A
number of pilots (2|2|0) mentioned events that occurred a decade or more ago and explained that with the technology
available today, that event might not have happened to them. Pilots used to have to rely exclusively on radio reports
and contact with Air Traffic Control (ATC) to estimate weather enroute. Today many pilots have a graphical display
that is more detailed and easier to interpret. This is exemplified in the following transcript excerpts.
“Having, again, a higher quality of real time, weather reporting in the aircraft at the time, probably would
have been the only thing that would have been able to help me.” [HAA2, Stage 2, 211]
“Our issue on that flight was a complete absence of technology that might help us. It was an older aircraft,
old panel, and there was nothing on board for weather.” [LE2, Stage 2, 176-177]
Although new equipment has improved flight safety in some conditions, some pilots have reported that new
technology was not helpful. Indeed, some low-altitude weather conditions such as fog are not picked up by radar or
any other existing tools. This is noted in the following transcript excerpts.
“In this scenario, I really don’t see any technological deficiency other than, you know, the lack of weather
reporting in the rural areas.” [HAA1, Stage 2, 289]
“And we do have live radar on the helicopter, but you know, we’re talking about lower ceilings, not really
major showers and things, so it didn’t really do much.” [HAA3, Stage 2, 60]
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The latency that many weather tools exhibit when displayed in the cockpit was an additional technological theme.
Most of the pilots mentioned that they were aware of latency with weather tools, especially with onboard weather
radar updated by satellite or through ADS-B (2|2|3). The frequency at which weather information is updated in-flight
can change based on a wide variety of factors, including but not limited to, the type of weather data (AWOS/ASOS,
Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) or radar), the type of data link (cellular, satellite or radio), the aircraft altitude,
and the terrain in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft. If outdated information is displayed to the pilot by a weather
source, it can lead to either false expectations regarding weather or confusion. One pilot even described a situation
in which all three weather sources available to him in-flight displayed conflicting weather information, leading to his
mission being cancelled and returning to base. This is noted in the transcript excerpt below.
“I know there’s like a six-minute delay in the ADS-B and the NEXRAD...it seemed like there was a
disconnect in what the aviation digital data service was showing, and what Foreflight was showing, and
to what was actually there.” [LE1, Stage 1, 308]
In some cases, pilots also were unknowingly relying on outdated information. One pilot described a scenario in
which a short-term lack of situational awareness about his XM weather radar led to a near accident. It goes to show
that weather can develop and become a source of immediate danger to an operator and an aircraft in very short periods
of time. This further highlights the importance of low latency, high refresh rate weather information, as described in
the following interview transcript excerpt.
“I’m looking at the weather radar, and I’m not seeing anything. Well, I wasn’t thinking about that
15-minute lag time. Well, during that 15-minute lag time all hell broke loose.” [HAA2, Stage 2, 159]
In addition to causing delays in weather data updates, one pilot (HAA3) mentioned that poor connectivity can
prevent pilots from being able to communicate with ATC. This can be especially problematic as pilots must be in
contact with ATC to request an IFR clearance, and are not legally allowed to enter IMC without being cleared.
One pilot (HAA1) emphasized that technology can overload the aviator who can sometimes focus more on his
instruments than on what is happening outside. HAA3 stated that "technology is not the answer" and that more focus
should be put on critical decision making rather than improving the technology even further.
D. Effect of External Pressures on Weather-Related Decision-Making
Another major theme that was common amongst many of the interviewed pilots (3|3|2) was the effect of external
pressures on their weather-related decision-making. Each industry and each operator can be subjected to unique
external pressures. For example, with HAA and some Law Enforcement operations, there are often lives on the line.
One flight can directly influence whether a patient lives or dies, as noted below.
“you know, it’s not supposed to affect our decision making, but we do have the added pressures of, you
know, we’re trying to get a patient to a hospital, whether he’s on board or not, whether we’re in route to
the scene or in route to the hospital.” [LE3, Stage 1, 235]
Air Tour / Air Taxi operations, on the other hand, typically deal with pressures from the clients themselves.
Especially for Very Important Person (VIP) transportation flights, customer satisfaction can be the difference between
getting repeat business or being forced out of business entirely. For these types of operations, the only way to make
money is to fly, leading to pilots taking more risks than they might in other fields. HAA and Law Enforcement operators
can typically afford to be more risk-averse because their operations are more tightly governed and the monetary impact
of turning down a single flight is much lower, as exemplified in the following interview transcript excerpts.
“... I want to take the flight, I want to make it fly. And so we do push...We stay within the limitations of the
FAA, but we push it right to the limit...I’ve got a client going I want to go from here to there.” [AT1, Stage
1, 367]
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“The customer is the most taxing part of the flight because as much as we try to not make it happen, there’s
going to be pressure from the customer...and we try to mitigate that as best as possible” [AT3, Stage 1,
533]
Despite the omnipresence of external pressures on pilots, many of them also mentioned both personal and company
policies that attempt to mitigate the effects of these pressures which are industry-specific. For Air Tour / Air Taxi
operators, external pressures require individual companies to set and reinforce solid safety criteria throughout the
company leading to a safety culture for pilots to operate within. The actual rules and regulations for these types of
flights allow for slightly more grey area in weather-related decision-making. This is noted below.
“That artificial need and desire to satisfy both your boss and your customer...What I need to keep reiterating
to them is: don’t do me any favors, okay? If the weather’s crappy, cancel the darn flight well lose money
but, you know, we’re gonna lose a lot more money if we look at it that way” [AT3, Stage 3, 879]
For HAA and Law Enforcement operations, once again, there are distinct differences. Company or governmental
policies for these industries tend to be stricter and are governed by formal policies and procedures that are well-
documented. These operations typically will adhere precisely to the weather policies outlined in their general operations
manuals (GOMs) and/or standard operating procedures (SOPs), as mentioned in the following interview transcript
excerpt.
“So, in a HEMS world, what dictates the weather that you need? Number one is what the Part 135 operation
vendor has in his general operations manual what we refer to as the GOM. The general operations manual
gives you your weather criteria that you’re allowed to fly in, which is then signed off by the Federal Aviation
Administration.” [HAA2, Stage 1, 139]
For all types of operations, its very important that the external pressures are mitigated as best as possible. This is
often done in two main ways. First, by providing context of the full consequences of pushing the limits. Second, by
implementing a safety culture and safety policies that support pilots making conservative weather decisions. Rewarding
risky behavior would be the antithesis of this, so extreme risk-taking must be discouraged at all costs, as exemplified
below.
“The general rule is you don’t want to risk killing three to save one...You got three people, highly trained
nurse, paramedic and a pilot. If I go out there and ball it up trying to get to one versus being a little
conservative, I take that asset off the playing field, and it can’t help anybody.” [HAA1, Stage 1, 582]
“We have the full support of the agency if we make an enroute weather decision to turn around and go
home” [LE3, Stage 1, 269]
E. Distrust of Weather Information
Pilots finally emphasized that weather information tends to either be misleading or to fail altogether in its purpose
(3|3|1). In some cases, as previously mentioned, pilots indicated that they have a personal policy to ignore specific
weather sources in their area. This, however, would constitute local or experiential knowledge. Pilots with less
experience, or pilots operating in an unfamiliar environment, would not have knowledge of the misleading or inaccurate
weather sources, and therefore would be required to spend more cognitive effort to decipher the disparity among sources.
This is exemplified in the following interview transcript excerpts.
“Our aviation weather forecasts here are notoriously inaccurate, and you learn to deal with it. And you
take that into account and you have built-in safety measures for that.” [LE3, Stage 1, 211-212]
“For us being in 2020, it never ceases to amaze me how inaccurate [the forecasts] are...” [HAA3, Stage
3, 30]
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Due to the readily available diverse technology for their operations, some pilots, especially in the HAA and Law
Enforcement fields, indicated that they always checked multiple weather sources and used as much technology as they
could to get the full picture of their flights. For example, multiple pilots revealed that they have used Night Vision
Goggles (NVGs) to identify clouds or fog layers that were invisible to the naked eye and were also unreported by local
weather reporting stations, as noted below. It is important to also note that radar-based technologies are currently
incapable of detecting light cloud and fog layers.
“There’s been times I’ve taken off from an airport that’s reporting VFR, and we start going out and I can
see through the goggles, that there’s an unreported cloud layer just outside of the airport. If you look
under the goggles, you can’t see it.” [LE2, Stage 2, 256-258]
F. High Workload Due to Weather
While not an explicit theme identified in the analysis, it is pertinent to discuss the relatively high workload
experienced by helicopter pilots. Most interviewed pilots (2|2|2) alluded to experiencing high cockpit workloads,
especially when there is adverse weather in their respective flight paths. Several pilots (2|1|1) mentioned strategies,
policies, or equipment that exists to mitigate high workloads. This includes autopilots, good crew resource management,
and enforcing a sterile cockpit in the presence of adverse weather. Others (1|1|1) emphasized how accessing in-flight
weather information can be challenging because flying a helicopter (especially without an autopilot) necessitates two
hands on the controls at all times. This is illustrated by the following quote:
“When you’re trying to fly in a single pilot aircraft that is not equipped with an autopilot or anything like
that, the cockpit does get rather busy at that point in time.” [HEMS2, Stage 2, 107]
The adverse effects of a high pilot workload can be mitigated when there is a co-pilot or a flight officer in the
cockpit. Having a trained aircrew or flight officer appeared common in the law enforcement domain, but was not highly
represented in the other industries. In HAA, the medical crew is trained to watch outside the aircraft for valuable
information to report to the pilot, but once a patient is onboard their focus is diverted to providing the requisite medical
attention. One Air Taxi pilot (AT3) mentioned flying with another pilot in marginal weather conditions, but also
emphasized that this is a very rare occurrence.
VI. Discussion
We began this investigation as an effort to address the following research questions:
1) How are pilots using weather information?
2) What is cognitively challenging about their use of weather information?
3) What are the cultural elements that influence their seeking and use of weather information?
4) Are there any common themes among weather incidents?
As previously discussed, the most common themes identified from the pilot interviews were sparsity of weather
sensing/reporting or lack of weather information, reliance on local or experiential weather knowledge, impact of current
technology on safety, external pressures on weather-related decision-making, and distrust of weather information. These
themes were identified while investigating the aforementioned research questions, and they shed light on the some of
the answers.
The survey and interviews gave the researchers an insight into what types of weather tools are being used among
pilots of different operation types and backgrounds. Pilots use many different tools to gather weather information,
both from FAA-approved sources and other supplementary sources. It was also indicated that pilots within the same
organization habitually gravitated toward the same tools. During preflight, pilots have access to significantly more
tools and weather information options than they do in-flight. In-flight, they are limited predominantly by the hardware
that is installed in their respective aircraft, whether that be avionics packages, onboard radar, or simply an external
portable device such as a phone or a tablet. There is no obvious difference among industries with respect to what tools
are used, except that some cockpits are better equipped than others, and that the HEMS tool is used predominantly by
HAA pilots.
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Pilots are predominantly using weather information preemptively. The most important weather check, as described
by the pilots, is the preflight weather check. This is largely because it is a deciding factor in whether the mission can
be undertaken. In-flight weather information is described to be more supplemental in nature. Pilots indicated that
when weather information availability or reliability was reduced, visual scanning was their most important method
of gathering in-flight weather information for their current route. The reasoning behind the pilots reliance on visual
scanning was simple: it is less cognitively demanding than scanning instruments or looking down at a graphical display.
Although pilots are mostly satisfied with the weather tools they have access to, during the interviews, all pilots
pointed several deficiencies in the weather data available to them. First, the data is too coarse spatially, thus pilots
often lack information along their route of flight. Second, some weather phenomenon, such as low clouds or fog,
are not properly captured by current weather tools. Third, weather forecast can be inaccurate. This explains why
pilots use multiple sources of weather information to get a clearer idea of what is happening, and why they rely
significantly on their local weather knowledge. This increases the workload for pilots, especially for less experienced
ones. Moreover, pilots reported having relatively aggressive weather minimums, which implies a need for more precise
weather information as the margins for error are smaller.
The most cognitively difficult aspect of using weather information seems to be when the weather information is
either missing or is borderline per the pilots personal or company policies. In these situations, the pilots are forced to
enter key decision gates that could potentially alter or cancel the mission being flown. This is especially true in-flight
because of the cognitive load of making decisions while piloting the aircraft. It is therefore extremely important that
any information being presented to pilots in-flight is not contributing significantly to task saturation. This evidence also
suggests that existing in-flight weather technologies may suffer from deficiencies with respect to cognitive overload
because the user interfaces are not transferring information efficiently to pilots. To this point, pilots suggested that an
effort be made to develop additional weather tools that can be used in-flight without contributing significantly to task
saturation. One specific recommendation that was reiterated by multiple pilots was to release a version of the HEMS
tool that is usable while in-flight.
There were also certain cultural elements that influenced when and how pilots fly and use weather information
in the process. Flying in marginal weather seemed commonplace for all of the pilots and their routine operations.
Pilots nearly all mentioned, in some capacity, that personal and/or company weather policies are central to the safety
of the operations and to aviation decision-making. These policies attempt to give pilots guidance when making
weather-related decisions. It should be noted that personal weather minimums and personal weather policies tended to
be significantly more conservative than company policies. Due to this delta between company and personal weather
policies, there may be additional external pressure placed on pilots to compromise their own safety minimums in favor
of more aggressive company minimums.
VII. Conclusions
The primary objective of this work was to provide a more personal and operator input-driven analysis of weather
information gaps in rotorcraft operations. Previous work has been done with the investigation of NTSB accident data
to identify weather-related themes for accidents, but this did not give a full picture of the challenges faced by helicopter
pilots with respect to weather. By having a more open-ended, conversational interview approach with various operators,
the results are driven by the operators and are less dictated by the study expectations or research plan.
The authors utilized two primary methods of data collection, a survey and a set of pilot interviews. A few key
themes were identified with regard to how pilots interact with weather information. These themes were sparsity
of weather sensing/reporting or lack of weather information, reliance on local or experiential weather knowledge,
impact of current technology on safety, external pressures on weather-related decision-making, and distrust of weather
information. Based on these themes, we provide the following recommendations:
1) Helicopter pilots would likely benefit from additional weather reporting stations being installed outside of
airports and densely populated areas – particularly in areas with significant helicopter activity. Pilots might also
benefit from being given access to non-FAA approved weather sources to supplement official weather data.
2) The HEMS tool would be of great use to the entire rotorcraft pilots community and not only to HAA pilots due
to its applicability to lower-altitude operations, as explained in section IV.A.
3) Pilots would benefit from the development of tools that more accurately predict and display light precipitation
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layers (such as fog) that are typically undetectable by a radar.
4) Pilots would benefit from being presented a coherent overview of current and near-term weather trends via
more comprehensive and capable in-flight weather tools (including displays). This would reduce the need to
integrate conflicting and out-of date information with prior experience, thereby eliminating sources of cognitive
workload.
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HOWI Operator Survey - Initial 
Survey Flow 
Standard: Consent (2 Questions) 
Standard: Precursor (1 Question) 
Standard: Flight Operations (7 Questions) 
Standard: Safety of Operations (6 Questions) 
Block: Operator Background (11 Questions) 
Standard: Follow-Up (3 Questions) 
Start of Block: Consent 
CONSENT DOCUMENT FOR ENROLLING ADULT PARTICIPANTS IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 Project Title:  Use of Weather Information in Rotorcraft Operations 
 Investigators: 
 Karen Feigh, Ph.D., Georgia Institute of Technology  
Alexia Payan, Ph.D., Georgia Institute of Technology  
Barrett Caldwell, Ph.D., Purdue University  
 You are being asked to be a volunteer in a research study. 
 Purpose: 
The purpose of this study is to better understand what kind of weather information is being used by the rotorcraft 
community. Specifically, we wish to identify any gaps in weather information availability or barriers to its effective 
use. We will be asking you a series of questions about your own experience with rotorcraft missions in general and 
with weather specifically.   
 Exclusion/Inclusion Criteria: 
Multiple classes of participants are sought for this study: Pilots holding a rotorcraft pilot license and employed in or 
having experience in any of the following domains: Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, Search and Rescue, 
Law Enforcement, Observation, Air Tour or Air Taxi. Dispatch services to rotorcraft pilots in any of the following 
domains: Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, Search and Rescue, Law Enforcement, Observation, Air Tour or 
Air Taxi.   
 Procedure: 
If you decide to participate, you will be presented with a series of questions in an electronic survey. The questions 
are designed to understand your experiences with rotorcraft operation and how weather impacts you. The questions 
further focus on how you obtain and use weather information in the execution of your duties as either the pilot or 
crew of a helicopter or dispatcher to a helicopter and crew. The questions will be presented over a series of pages. 
You may stop or go back at any point during the survey. 
 Risks or Discomforts: 
 No risks are associated with this study beyond that normally experienced when describing past experiences with a 
colleague or using a computer for routine office work. 
 Benefits: 
Appendix I - HOWI Survey
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You are not likely to benefit in any immediate way from joining this study. However, your participation in this study 
may assist researchers in understanding how to improve weather information availability and training.   
 
 Compensation to You:   
No compensation for your time is available. 
  
Storing and Sharing your Information: 
Your participation in this study is gratefully acknowledged. It is possible that your information/data will be 
enormously valuable for other research purposes. By signing below, you consent for your de-identified 
information/data to be stored by the research team and to be shared with other researchers in future studies. If you 
agree to allow such future sharing and use, your identity will be completely separated from your information/data. 
Future researchers will not have a way to identify you. Any future research must be approved by an ethics 
committee before being undertaken.    
 
 Confidentiality: 
The following procedures will be followed to keep your personal information confidential in this study: we will 
comply with any applicable laws and regulations regarding confidentiality. To protect your privacy, your name will 
not be recorded and your records will be kept under a code number. Your de-identified information may be used for 
future research without attaining additional consent from you. The Georgia Institute of Technology IRB and the 
Office of Human Research Protections may look over study records during required reviews. 
 
You should be aware that the experiment is being run from a ‘secure’ https server of the kind typically used to 
handle credit card transactions, so the responses are protected from third parties such as hackers. In general, the web 
page software will log as header lines the IP address of the machine you use to access this page, 
e.g.,102.403.506.807, but otherwise no other information will be stored unless you explicitly enter it. 
 
 Costs to You:  
 There are no costs to you, other than your time, for being in this study. 
o Yes, I understand and wish to participate  
o No, I do not wish to participate  
Skip To: End of Survey If CONSENT DOCUMENT FOR ENROLLING ADULT PARTICIPANTS IN A RESEARCH 
STUDY Project Title:  Use of Weat... = No, I do not wish to participate 
 
Questions about the Study: 
   If you have any questions about the study, you may contact Dr. Alexia Payan at alexia.payan@gatech.edu. 
 
Questions about Your Rights as a Research Participant:  
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study if you don't want to be. You have 
the right to change your mind and leave the study at any time without giving any reason and without penalty. Any 
new information that may make you change your mind about being in this study will be given to you. You do not 
waive any of your legal rights by agreeing to participate. 
  If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact Ms. Melanie Clark, Georgia 
Institute of Technology Office of Research Integrity Assurance, at (404) 894-6942.  or Ms. Kelly Winn, Georgia 
Institute of Technology Office of Research Integrity Assurance, at (404) 385- 2175.   
Note that by completing the online survey, you indicate your consent to be in the study.   
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o Proceed to survey  
o No, I do not wish to participate  
Skip To: End of Survey If Questions about the Study: If you have any questions about the study, you may contact Dr. 
Alexia... = No, I do not wish to participate 
End of Block: Consent 
 
Start of Block: Precursor 
Directions:   Please, complete this survey as truthfully and as completely as possible. You may refrain from 
completing any questions you don’t feel comfortable answering.       
The survey should take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete.       
Thank you very much for your participation. 
End of Block: Precursor 
 
Start of Block: Flight Operations 
What types of terrain are most common for your flight operations? 
▢ City  
▢ Suburban  
▢ Mountainous  
▢ Flatland  
▢ Coastal  
▢ Canyonlands  
▢ Forested  
▢ Other (Please explain) _____________________________________________ 
 
What types of weather conditions are most common for your flight operations? 
▢ Daytime VFR  
▢ Nighttime VFR  
▢ Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)  
▢ Flight with Night Vision Devices (NVD)  
▢ Other (Please explain) _____________________________________________ 
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What weather-related tools and resources do you use during preflight preparation? Please specify your sources. 
▢ Online weather reports _____________________________________________ 
▢ Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) __________________________________________ 
▢ Preflight weather brief from 3rd party source _____________________________ 
▢ Risk management tools ____________________________________________ 
▢ Personal electronic device (cell phone, tablet, computer, etc.) ______________ 
▢ Other (Please explain) _____________________________________________ 
 
What weather-related tools and resources do you use for in-flight operations? Please specify your sources. 
▢ Radio-based weather reporting (AWOS, ASOS, etc.)  
▢ Flight Service Stations  
▢ Multi-Function Display (MFD) readouts (NEXRAD, broadcast weather services, etc.)  
▢ Personal electronic device readouts (phone/tablet applications, etc.)  
▢ Dispatch communications  
▢ Other (Please explain) _____________________________________________ 
 
Do you feel that you currently have access to all relevant weather-related information and/or tools required to 
conduct and/or support your operations?  If not, please explain. 
o Yes  
o No ________________________________________________ 
 
Do you believe that the type(s) of weather-related information/tools you currently use and/or have access to are 
relevant and sufficient to conduct safe operations?  If not, please explain. 
o Yes  
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Do you believe that the latency in the tools that you currently use to obtain weather-related information may be a 
hindrance to conducting safe operations? If yes, please explain. 
o Yes ________________________________________________ 
o No  
 
End of Block: Flight Operations 
 
Start of Block: Safety of Operations 
Do you know of any examples of someone having encountered or come close to encountering any of these adverse 
weather conditions, regardless of purpose of flight? 
▢ Low cloud ceiling  
▢ Heavy precipitation  
▢ High winds  
▢ Wind shift  
▢ Gusts/Turbulence  
▢ Microbursts  
▢ Heavy fog  
▢ Freezing temperatures  
▢ Icing  
▢ Mountain obscuration  
▢ Mountain wave  
▢ Flat light/Whiteout  
▢ Whiteout/Brownout  
▢ Other (Please specify) ______________________________________________ 
▢ None  
Skip To: End of Block If Do you know of any examples of someone having encountered or come close to 
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Display This Question: 
If Do you know of any examples of someone having encountered or come close to encountering any of th... != 
None 
Did this encounter with any of the previously mentioned adverse weather conditions lead to a reportable aviation 
'incident' or 'accident'? If yes, please list the cause.  
{Low cloud ceiling, Heavy precipitation, High winds, Heavy fog, Freezing temperatures, Mountain obscuration, 
Whiteout/Brownout, Other} 
o Yes - Incident (Please explain) _________________________________________ 
o Yes - Accident (Please explain) ________________________________________ 
o No  
Skip To: End of Block If Did this encounter with any of the previously mentioned adverse weather conditions lead to 
a repo... = No 
 
Please briefly explain the event that led to the incident or accident. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Were there any external factors involved at the time of the event?  If so, please use the slider bars to quantify the 
impact that this had on your operations. 










VIP or Patient Transport  
 
Other (Please explain) 
 
 
Do you believe that the crew were adequately prepared to handle the event? If no, please explain. 
o Yes  
o No ________________________________________________ 
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End of Block: Safety of Operations 
 
Start of Block: Operator Background 
What is your age range? 
o Under 25  
o 25-40  
o 41-55  
o 56-70  
o 71+  
 
What is your operational duty? Select all that apply and fill in how many years you have been in this position. 
▢ Pilot ________________________________________________ 
▢ Crew ________________________________________________ 
▢ Dispatcher ____________________________________________ 
▢ Other (Please Explain) ___________________________________ 
 
If you are a pilot, what is your piloting experience? Select all that apply and fill in how many flight hours you 
currently have toward each rating. 
▢ Rotorcraft Pilot ________________________________________________ 
▢ Fixed-Wing Pilot ________________________________________________ 
▢ Other (Please explain) ___________________________________________ 
▢ Not a Pilot  
 
Display This Question: 
If If you are a pilot, what is your piloting experience? Select all that apply and fill in how many... != Not a 
Pilot 
Do you hold an instrument rating? Select all that apply and fill in how many hours of instrument time you hold. 
▢ Rotorcraft Instrument Rating ________________________________________ 
▢ Fixed-Wing Instrument Rating _______________________________________ 
▢ None  
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Display This Question: 
If Do you hold an instrument rating? Select all that apply and fill in how many hours of instrument... != None 
Are you current on your instrument rating? Select all that apply. 
▢ Yes, current for Helicopter Instrument  
▢ Yes, current for Fixed-Wing Instrument  
▢ Not current on Instrument Rating  
 
Display This Question: 
If If you are a pilot, what is your piloting experience? Select all that apply and fill in how many... = Rotorcraft 
Pilot 
Did you receive training on how to recover from spatial disorientation or Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological 
Conditions (IIMC) in a rotorcraft? 
o Yes  
o No  
o I don't remember  
 
Display This Question: 
If Did you receive training on how to recover from spatial disorientation or Inadvertent Instrument... = Yes 
What type of training did you receive? (Please select all that apply) 
▢ Classroom Instruction  
▢ In-Flight Training  
▢ Simulator  
▢ Military Training  
▢ Civil/Commercial Training  
▢ Other (Please specify) _____________________________________________ 
 
Display This Question: 
If Did you receive training on how to recover from spatial disorientation or Inadvertent Instrument... = Yes 
When were you last trained to recover from spatial disorientation or IIMC? 
o Less than 6 months ago  
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o Between 6 months and 1 year ago  
o Between 1 and 2 years ago  
o More than 2 years ago  
 
Display This Question: 
If If you are a pilot, what is your piloting experience? Select all that apply and fill in how many... = Rotorcraft 
Pilot 
What classes of rotorcraft do you have experience with? Select all that apply and fill in how many hours you 
currently have for each type. 
▢ Single Main Rotor ________________________________________________ 
▢ Tandem Rotors ________________________________________________ 
▢ Intermeshing Rotors ________________________________________________ 
▢ Coaxial Rotors ________________________________________________ 
▢ Other (Please explain) ______________________________________________ 
 
Display This Question: 
If If you are a pilot, what is your piloting experience? Select all that apply and fill in how many... = Fixed-
Wing Pilot 
What classes of fixed-wing aircraft do you have experience with? Select all that apply and fill in how many hours 
you currently have for each type. 
▢ Single-Engine (Piston) ______________________________________________ 
▢ Multi-Engine (Piston) _______________________________________________ 
▢ Turbine ________________________________________________ 
▢ Other (Please explain) ______________________________________________ 
 
In what operational domain is your experience? Select all that apply and fill in how many years of experience you 
have in that domain. 
▢ Emergency Medical Services or Air Ambulance __________________________ 
▢ Search & Rescue ________________________________________________ 
▢ Aerial Observation or Surveillance _____________________________________ 
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▢ Commercial Air Tour or Air Taxi ______________________________________ 
▢ Military ________________________________________________ 
▢ Private or Recreational ____________________________________________ 
▢ Other (Please explain) _____________________________________________ 
End of Block: Operator Background 
 
Start of Block: Follow-Up 
Would you be interested in continuing your participation in this study? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
Display This Question: 
If Would you be interested in continuing your participation in this study? = Yes 
And Did this encounter with any of the previously mentioned adverse weather conditions lead to a repo... != 
No 
Would you be willing to participate in an interview with a researcher to gain a better understanding of the weather-
related event you were involved in? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
Display This Question: 
If Would you be interested in continuing your participation in this study? = Yes 
Or Would you be willing to participate in an interview with a researcher to gain a better understand... = Yes 
Thank you for your interest in assisting us with this study!  Please fill in your contact information below (one 
method is sufficient) and we will reach out to you at a later date! 
▢ Email Address ________________________________________________ 
▢ Phone Number ________________________________________________ 




Appendix II - HOWI Operator Interview Questions Set
This document provides the structure for interviewing helicopter pilots. The structure is mostly taken from the
ACTA approach developed by Militello and Hutton [11], and the timeline construction was taken from the Critical
Decision Method approach [18]. The interview below should take an estimated time of 3 hours.
Introduction: Thank you for making yourself available today. We will cover part I or II or III of the interview
today. Please go over the consent form and let me know if you have any questions. You may leave the study at any time
in case of an emergency or if you are uncomfortable. We will be recording audio. (After consent)
Stage 1: Surface-level interview and task diagram
• Please describe the main types of missions you fly at a very high level. Interviewer must pick one of these to
focus on.
• Thinking specifically about [this] type of mission, can you break this mission down into 3 to 6 steps? Please
make sure to specify how and when you access or take into account weather information unless you do not, then
please just let me know that.
• Now, among the steps that you have identified here, what ones are cognitively difficult? In other words, what are
the steps that involve thinking, judging, problem solving, decision-making or assessments?
• Going deeper are any of the steps that involve gathering, manipulating or considering weather cognitively
difficulty? How so?
• How does this change with degraded visual conditions?
Stage 2: Weather incident overview
• Think of a particular scenario in which the weather significantly altered your standard operating procedures for
the given mission? Could you please draw a timeline of that mission?
• Could you please give me a brief overview of the weather information you attended to, how you obtained it, if
you needed to manipulate it in any way, or if you had to project it into the future. Please indicate this on the
timeline.
• Could you please give me a brief overview of any aspects of the technology that made performing the mission
particularly difficult? Please indicate this on the timeline.
• Think of a particular scenario in which [a different type of weather] significantly altered your standard operating
procedures for the given mission? Could you please draw a timeline of that mission?
• Could you please give me a brief overview of the weather information you attended to, how you obtained it, if
you needed to manipulate it in any way, or if you had to project it into the future for this other scenario. Please
indicate this on the timeline.
• Could you please give me a brief overview of any aspects of the technology that made performing this other
scenario particularly difficult? Please indicate on the timeline.
Stage 3: Knowledge audit
• Maintaining a big picture view of a mission can be important. What do you pay attention to, in order to maintain
the big picture? Thinking specifically about weather, what do you pay attention to in order to maintain situational
awareness of the weather and its impact on the mission?
• As the pilot, you are often the point person on the overall mission team. You may also have had an experience
of noticing something that others did not during the mission. Could you give an example of such an experience
where you noticed something that popped out at you and that others did not notice? Any weather-related examples
come to mind?
• When you perform a mission, are there ways of working smartly, efficiently, or accomplishing more with less
- that you have found useful? This could be an example of something that saves time, resources, or reduces
workload. Can you give any examples with specific relationship to weather information?
• Following from the previous question, can you think of any equipment that made things easier, especially under
challenging weather conditions?
• Can you think of an example when you have improvised something on your own in this task or noticed an
opportunity to do something better or different from what was prescribed in standard operating procedures or
manuals? Any weather-related examples come to mind?
• Have you experienced a situation where you realized on your own that your performance on the mission was not
what it should have been and decided to change the way you were performing in order to get the job done? What
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made you realize this situation?
• Can you describe an instance when you spotted a weather-related deviation from the norm, or knew something
was amiss? What made you notice this?
• Equipment can sometimes be misleading. Have there been situations when the equipment in the cockpit gave you
information that you disregarded and instead proceeded with your own judgment based on your own experience?
What made you disregard it? Any weather-related examples come to mind?
Conclusion: Thank you very much for your time. Your data is very valuable for the study. If you have any questions
or concerns about the study, please do not hesitate to contact [Interviewer / Prof. Karen Feigh]. Thanks again.
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VIII. Appendix III - Interview Transcription Evidence Categories
How are pilots using weather information?
1) Does it differ among different stages of flight?
2) Does it depend on the type of mission?
3) Does it depend on the pilots expectations for the flight?
What is cognitively difficult about the pilots’ use of weather information?
1) Do they have to transform multiple pieces of weather information to get a full picture?
2) Do they have to project weather information into the future?
3) Do they have to take into account the latency of certain weather information sources?
4) Is the weather information too coarse for it to be useful?
5) Conflicting, missing, or incorrect weather information?
What are the cultural elements that influence their seeking and use of weather information?
1) Standard operating procedures?
2) Single vs. dual pilot operations?
3) Personal, habitual, or training-related?
4) External pressures?
5) Local knowledge?
Were there any common themes among weather incidents?
1) Technological?
2) Company or personal weather policy?
3) Conflicting, missing, or incorrect weather information?
4) Erroneous pilot expectations?
5) Weather information misinterpretation?
6) Company or personal willingness to self-assess during or post-flight?
7) Company or personal response?
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